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AN INTRODUCTION TO GO

by Max Steinbook

PART II

This part will concern itself chiefly with the clearing up of any misunderstandings that might arise from the rather brief statement of the rules given in Part I.

In diagram I, figures A, B and C show the method of killing one black stone. Figure A shows the stone in the extreme corner, and only two white stones are necessary to kill it. At this stage, the black stone is removed from the board. Figure B shows the black stone along the edge, and three white stones are now necessary to capture it. Figure C shows the stone in the middle of the board, which necessitates the use of four white stones for its capture. Figures D and E show the application of this rule as applied to the capture of two stones.

Figure F shows three black stones in the corner that are entirely surrounded by white stones. They are, however, not yet captured, since they still have one inside liberty. As soon as W plays at 1, filling the inside liberty, the stones are captured and removed from the board. Note that W was able to play at this point, although he was entirely surrounded by black stones, since in so doing, he captured a group of one or more opposing stones. Were the black stones not entirely surrounded, the play would be a suicide play, and W would not be able to play at all.

Figure G shows a common situation, which beginners often fail to recognize. The three black stones are almost entirely surrounded by six white stones, with only one liberty remaining to them. It would be useless for B to try to escape, for instance by playing at 1, since W would play at 2, leaving only one liberty again; and if B plays at 3, W will play at 4, B at 5, and now W has several methods of killing the black stones, the one shown here being W6, B7, and W8, killing seven black stones. This figure is called a ladder, or shicho, in Japanese; and unless B has a stone placed somewhere in the path of his escape, it will always result in the capture of all the black stones, no matter how far from the edge of the board the figure is started.

Figure H shows a black group with three inside liberties entirely surrounded by a white group. If it is B's turn to play, he can place a stone at 1, forming two separate and distinct points or liberties, and make his group forever safe from capture. These points are called me or eyes by the Japanese. Since W can only play one stone at a time, the group cannot be captured by W playing at 2; for example, since the point at 3 would still be free, and W would therefore be making a suicide move. However, if it is W's play at the point shown on the diagram, he can play at 1 and kill the entire black group. If B makes no

further move in this position, W plays again at 2, threatening the entire group. Although B can capture these two stones by playing at 3, in doing so he fills in one of his original three liberties, and now only points 1 and 2 are free. W now plays at 1, again threatening the group, and after B captures one stone by playing at 2, he has now reduced his inside liberties to only one, and W plays at 1 and picks up the nine black stones. Note that W loses nothing by any plays made after the first one at point 1, since for every stone he loses he captures an additional black stone.




Diagram J shows a position called ko. This explains the rule about not being able to make a play which will duplicate a former position on the board. B can play at 1, and capture one white stone. However, W cannot immediately recapture by playing at 2, since the position on the board would revert to the previous position existing before B1. W must therefore make an intervening play on some other part of the board; and if B does not fill at 2, W can now play there and capture one stone. At this point also, B cannot recapture at once, but must make one intervening play. This rule, however, does not apply to figure K, since when W plays at 1, he captures two black stones. B can therefore immediately recapture the one white stone at 1, by playing at 2, since the position would not be the same as at the start of the maneuver, as the black stone at 3 would not be present.

Figure L shows a position in which the life of the black and white groups depends on the outcome of a ko. If it is B's play, he can play at 1, capturing the

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An Introduction to Go [continued]

white stone at 2, and threaten to capture the rest of the white stones in that vicinity by playing at 5. If W, however, can find a play on some other part of the board that will threaten an even greater group, B will be forced to answer, and now W can play back again at 2, threatening to capture the six black stones in the corner by playing at 3. It would do B no good to play at 3 himself, since W could capture all the eleven black stones by playing at 4. Therefore, whoever has the more ko threats available at this time will win the opponent's group.




Diagram 2

Figure M shows a black group surrounded by white stones that is safe no matter who has the first play. If it is W's turn to play, and he plays at 1, B will capture the stone by playing at 2, forming two eyes. If W plays at 4, B will capture at 3, with the same result. If W plays at 2, B will play at 3, and if W plays at 3, B will play at 2. In both cases, although B does not directly capture the white stone, the play forms

two eyes, since W cannot make any further play in the position. The white stone left in the group is a prisoner and is removed by the black player at the end of the game.

Figures N and O show another type of formation which neither B nor W can play into without losing his own stones. In figure O, if W should play at 1, B will capture the four white stones by playing at 2; and furthermore, as we have just seen in Figure M, make his group safe from any subsequent attack. If, however, B should attempt to capture the three white stones by playing either at 1 or 2, W would immediately capture all the black stones by playing on the other point. This type of situation, in which neither player can play further, is called *seki*; and the vacant points on the inside, as well as the three white stones, do not count for either side. Figure N shows another *seki* in the corner. It is obvious that if either W or B places a stone on the inside, the opponent can capture the opposing inside group on the next play. Of course a *seki* can be maintained only as long as the outside men themselves are safe from capture. For instance, if B should succeed in capturing the three outside white stones in Figure N, the three white stones on the inside would also be lost.

PROBLEMS

Saving Threatened Groups

Go problems frequently represent situations so similar to many occurring in actual play that they are of great value in acquiring tactical skill. In a well constructed problem, there is only one correct first play. Lines of play which lead to a ko are not considered solutions, since the life or death of the group would then depend on which player had the greater number of ko threats. An exception, of course, is the type of problem in which the stated objective is "Black to play for ko."

In each of the five problems which will be scattered through this issue, Black has the first play. If he plays correctly, he can make a safe group. The solutions are shown on page 32.

MODERN GO GAMES

First Honinbo Title Match

From early in the seventeenth century, when the first Japanese Go academies were founded, until the death of Honinbo Shusai shortly before World War II, the best Japanese Go player of each generation was formally adopted into the family of the previous champion and assumed the name of Honinbo. Since the name or title of Honinbo was held for life, it could happen that a stronger player, reaching maturity after a new Honinbo had been chosen, might die without ever bearing the coveted name.

Shusaku, regarded by the Japanese as the strongest player of all times, is a case in point. His death preceded that of the then current Honinbo.

Honinbo Shusai was the last to hold the title for life. The present intention is to hold annual tournaments to determine the title holder for the succeeding year.

The first of these matches was played in 1940-41. Competitive play culminated in a final round of six games between Sekiyama Riichi and Kato Shin. The match has added interest because these two men represent two different schools of Go players: Kato is a conservative player of the classical school, Sekiyama is one of the leading exponents of the new, more daring style (shin fuseki). The first game, with Sekiyama playing White, was won by Kato, and was reported in the first article of this series.

Game 2

Tokyo, 15th-27th April, 1941

Black: Sekiyama Riichi 12 hours, 2 minutes
White: Kato Shin 12 hours, 56 minutes

Comments by Suzuki Tamijiro
Translated by Dr Frederick M. Mossner

Black	White	Black	White
1 R16	2 D16	19 F6	20 J4
3 P16	4 Q4	21 K4	22 J5
5 E4	6 C4	23 F7	24 K5
7 C3	8 B3	25 F9 n	26 M3
9 D3	10 B5	27 M2 n	28 N3 n
11 K3 n	12 D7	29 N2	30 O4
13 O3	14 R6 n	31 P3	32 P4
15 L17 n	16 G4 n	33 L5 n	34 L6
17 E6	18 E7	35 N4 n	36 M4 an

•11 K3. More daring than the usual J3.

•14 R6. If White plays Q14, Black may answer R8. The R6 play is somewhat more conservative than usual, giving White a safe base, so that he may be ready to fight against a large expansion of Black's R16-P16 position.


•15 L17. Although this point is important, it is dangerous to neglect the s border. The correct play

for Black would have been •15 F6, leading to •16 L17, •17 E8.

•16 G4. This is the tactically correct play for a penetration of the Black territory. The succeeding plays, up to •24, constitute the "proper sequence."

•25 F9. If •25 L5, then •26 L6, •27 M5, •28 F8, •29 G8, •30 G7 (or, if Black instead of •29 G8 plays •29 H7, then •30 G8, •31 H6, •32 K7) and Black will have a narrow escape.

•27 M2. If Black plays •27 M4 instead, then •28 N4, •29 N3, •30 L4, •31 M5, •32 L3, •33 O5, and the Black stones at O3 and K3-K4 are separated; and the latter stones are lost.



•28 N3. If White plays •28 L2 instead, two variations are possible:

(1) •29 M4, •30 N3, •31 N4, •32 N2, •33 K2, •34 O4, •35 L5, •36 O5, and Black is at a disadvantage.

(2) •29 Q3, •30 L4, •31 R3. The second alternative is better, since Black secures the corner.

•33 L5. R2 would also be a good play.

•35 N4. This play is in proper sequence. If Black played •35 M5 instead, there would follow: •36 M6, •37 N5, •38 N6. White would thus get a solid position in the middle.


•36 M4. If White played •36 N5 instead, he would lose two stones.

Black	White	Black	White
37 M5	38 N5+	63 E8	64 C7 n
39 M6	40 L4 n	65 F11 n	66 H13
41 L7 a	42 K8	67 H16 n	68 N7
43 K6+	44 J6 n	69 M7	70 Q2
45 M9	46 R11	71 P2	72 P1
47 Q10	48 Q11	73 O1	74 Q1
49 P10	50 S9 n	75 L3 a	76 N4
51 K10	52 J10	77 Q3	78 R3 a
53 J11 n	54 H10	79 O2	80 R2
55 H8	56 J8	81 J2	82 H2
57 H7	58 J7	83 G2 n	84 J3
59 K11	60 K9	85 K2	86 F12
61 L9	62 H11	87 E11 n	88 J12

•64 C7. This play appears weak, but if White plays •64 D8, there follows •65 D9, •66 C9, •67 D10, •68 C10, •69 D11 threatening •71 C6. If White plays •64 D5, then •65 E4, •66 H13, •67 D6, •68 C6, •69 C7. Both of these sequences are disadvantageous for White.

•65 F11. If •65 H12, then •66 F11, •67 G12, •68 F10, •69 D9, •70 D11, and White is in a better position strategically.

•67 H16. If Black plays •67 R2 instead, to protect against •Q2, White will play •68 J16, •69 L15, •70 J15. Thus White would secure important points and be immune to attack in the center as well.




37 - 62

•40 L4. The white position looks poor, since White cannot attack without losing sente. (•42 L3 would lead to •43 L2, threatening to take five stones). The play is, however, a good one, since it cuts off the black stones around M5 and is a preparation for an attack at Q2 as well.

•44 J6. What is the next play for Black? If he plays J7, White plays K7, and Black is at a disadvantage, since White would have the advantage in this ko fight.

•50 S9. This play secures White against an attack at R9.

•53 J11. Very good. If Black played •53 J7 instead, there would follow: •54 K7, •55 J8, •56 L6+, •57 L3, •58 N4, •59 K6+, •60 J9, •61 G8, •62 L6, •63 M8, •64 K9, •65 K6+, •66 J2, and Black has the worst of it.




63 - 88

•83 G2. This is unexpectedly weak. The correct play would be an attack at C4. The black stones on the s border are safe; for if White attacks at L1, Black replies L2. Then there might follow •J1, •H3, •J3, (or, somewhat better, •G2, leading to •J3, •G3, •K1, •K2+, •M1) •K2, •G2, •M1 and Black has two eyes.

•87 E11. If •87 E12, then •88 F13, •89 E11 with gote.

[Gote is closely related to sente, a Japanese word used by most American players. Gote has a broad and a narrow meaning. Its narrow meaning is a term of reproach: the player has needlessly given up sente. In its broad meaning, the player has indeed given up sente, but for a strategic advantage more important than keeping sente, Sekiyama in Gote no Sente (Sente in Gote) gives many examples of this strategic abandonment of sente.]

Black	White	Black	White
89 M11	90 F13 n	123 L11	124 P13
91 F17	92 E17	125 Q12	126 R12
93 F16	94 C15	127 R13 n	128 Q14
95 D14	96 C14	129 S13	130 S15
97 K13 n	98 D13	131 R10	132 S11
99 P11 n	100 L16	133 S10	134 T10
101 M17 n	102 Q13	135 O11	136 R8 n
103 D12	104 C13	137 O13 a	138 O14 a
105 P14	106 S16	139 N12+	140 P15+
107 S17	108 R15	141 Q15	142 R14
109 Q16	110 J15	143 N15 n	144 S18
111 J16	112 F18	145 R17	146 T17 n
113 G18	114 K12 n	147 R18	148 E18 n
115 L12	116 L13 n	149 T14	150 T12
117 L14	118 M13	151 H9	152 J9
119 K15	120 O12	153 B12	154 C9
121 P12	122 M12	155 B10 n	156 B13 n



89 - 122


•90 F13. If White plays the usual E12, there follows: •91 D12, •92 D13, •93 C13, •94 C14, •95 C12.

•97 K13. If •97 D13, then •98 L13.

•99 P11. An important play. Black threatens to form a large territory in the center.

•101 M17. If Black plays K17 and White answers J15, Black must occupy K16; otherwise the ne corner is vulnerable.

•114 K12. If •114 K15, there follows •115 E16, •116 E18, •117 H14, •118 J14, •119 J13, •120 H15, •121 G14, •122 G15, •123 F14; and the white stones on line 15 are cut off.



123 - 156

•116 L13. The last two White plays are marvellous. If White plays •116 J14 instead, Black counters with •117 L14, and the subsequent game would be "thin Go" for White, with little chance for victory.

•127 R13. This play is poor. Correct sequence would be: •127 R10. There might follow:

(1) •128 S10, •129 R13, •130 Q14, •131 S13, •132 S12, •133 T12 a, •134 S11, •135 Q15, •136 R14, •137 O13, •138 O14 a, •139 S15 a, •140 N13+, •141 S14 a, •142 P15+, •143 O15 a.

(2) •128 S11, •129 S10, •130 T10. In either case White would suffer a severe loss.

•136 R8. If White omits to play here, Black plays S8. There would follow •R9, •R8, •Q9, •P8, and White loses.

•143 N15. If •143 O16 a, then •144 N13 a, •145 O12, •146 P14, •147 N15 and Black gets many stones with sente. Or, if instead of •146 P14 in the above sequence, White plays •146 N15, then •147 P14+, •148 R17, leading to ko.


•146 T17. The last two white plays cleverly utilize sente.

•148 E18. The first important play of the end-game. If Black occupies this intersection, White loses about 13 points.

•155 B10. The last two black plays are in proper sequence.

•156 B13. If White omits this play, Black wins seven points in the finish, with sente.

Black	White	Black	White
157 G19 n	158 T18	201 O9	202 P14 n
159 S19	160 L8	203 N14 a	204 S14
161 M8	162 P8 n	205 R9	206 S8
163 O15 a	164 N13 a	207 D5	208 C5
165 O12	166 T13	209 D6	210 G6
167 B2	168 A2	211 C6	212 B6
169 C1	170 H3	213 D9	214 B7
171 J1	172 B9 n	215 F19	216 E19
173 J13 an	174 H12	217 G14	218 E16 a
175 H14	176 F2 n	219 F15	220 H6
177 F3	178 G3 a	221 A4	222 B4
179 E2 a	180 G1+	223 F5	224 G5
181 O7	182 O8	225 K7	226 C10
183 N6 a	184 O6 a	227 A13	228 A14
185 N8+	186 P7 a	229 A12	230 A10
187 F14	188 G10	231 B11	232 E1
189 F4	190 G9	233 D1	234 F1
191 G8	192 D8	235 H1 a	236 G2
193 E9	194 E12	237 Q8	238 Q7
195 C11	196 C12 a	239 Q9	240 G13
197 D11	198 E14 a	241 G11	242 N7+
199 E15 a	200 D15+	243 B1	244 O7



157 - 200

•157 G19. Blocks White from winning five points with sente. If Black had played •157 Q7, there would have followed •158 O7, •159 Q7, and Black must later play P8. At this point, White had no time for prolonged deliberation, since he had only forty-four minutes of play left; and the game was still highly complex with many unsettled situations.

•162 P8. If Black continues with •163 O7, there follows •164 O8, •165 N6 a, •166 O6 a, •167 N8+, •168 P7a. Thus •160 wins one point with sente.


•172 B9. Necessary, but loses sente.

•173 J13. Not good! •173 F3 would be correct.

•176 F2. Here White misses the last opportunity to play F3. There would have followed: •177 G10 (Black must make eyes), •178 E2.

•202 P14. If White allows Black to take the ko and plays S14, Black plays N14. •202, therefore, means a gain of four points with gote.

Sekiyama (Black) who made no mistakes in the end play, finally won by one point—truly a dangerous game!



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ERRATA

Game 1

Diagram 1—20: B stone at Q4.

•4 F4, line 2: White not Black.

Diagram 2: a should be ignored.

•67: add S12.

•78: add E17.

•103 L18: •M18 not •M18.

•109 P8: •107 Q7 not Q17.

•126 B13, line 5: B14 not •14.

Igo Gairon I

Diagram 1 of Igo Gairon, formations B and C are interchanged.

UNANNOTATED GAMES

The following is the first of a series of unannotated games, by Japanese masters of the classical and modern periods, to be presented from time to time in these columns.

There are available a great wealth of games without translation of Japanese comment. The reader may find the suggestions which follow valuable in studying these games.

(1) Divide the game into sections, according to who has sente.

(2) Try to define in one sentence what was going on in each of these sections. In most cases this is possible—that is, each section has a specific strategic topic.

(3) Consider with the utmost attention the plays on which sente was abandoned. They are invariably the "largest" plays available on the board. Try to estimate how many points they are worth; look for other possible plays; try to determine why these are inferior to the play the master selected.

(4) Play the game over, trying at each play to decide what you would do before looking to see what

the master did. You will thus have the master's comment on your play. Try to read it intelligently. You would make a non-committal territory play; the master keeps sente. You would jump into an adversary's territory; the master presses from outside. It is much more important to look for such principal differences of strategy than to look for special combinations. In a specialized combination you will never find the master-play, but in the general pattern of your Go-thinking you should try to apply a master's standards.

Played in this way a game will require a good deal of time, but you will be sure of making rapid strides in your playing strength. Soon you will find situations in actual play which look somewhat familiar. You will say to yourself: "A master would play in a certain way, but I am afraid; I shall be more cautious." Check your impulse; play as you think the master would. In most cases it will be the superior play and very often the safer one. "Cautious" plays which are rejected by masters often turn out to be weak and insufficient defenses.

Rudolf Aron


Game Number 1

Black: Yasui Sentetsu (1638-1715)

White: Honinbo Dosaku 4th (1644-1702)

Played November 17th, 1670; W won by 9 points

Black	White	Black	White
1 K10	2 P3	55 H13	56 H9
3 C15	4 P17	57 G7	58 H7
5 K3	6 E3	59 H6	60 J7
7 R4	8 C4	61 G6	62 F14
9 C10	10 D17	63 E13	64 H14
11 F17	12 E17	65 J13	66 K5
13 G16	14 D15	67 F3	68 E4
15 D14	16 E15	69 L4	70 J17
17 C16	18 C17	71 J16	72 H17
19 E14	20 F15	73 H16	74 F18
21 L17	22 R16	75 K17	76 L7
23 R9	24 M3	77 Q8	78 J4
25 G3	26 Q5	79 J3	80 H4
27 R5	28 Q6	81 G4	82 L2
29 R6	30 Q7	83 K2	84 O7
31 R7	32 C7	85 O8	86 B7
33 R15	34 Q15	87 N7	88 N6
35 R14	36 S16	89 O6	90 N5
37 Q14	38 D12	91 E2	92 D2
39 F13	40 D10	93 E1	94 D1
41 D9	42 E10	95 F2	96 P7
43 C11	44 C12	97 N8	98 B12
45 C8	46 D7	99 B14	100 L5
47 E9	48 F10	101 M4	102 N3
49 F9	50 G10	103 G8	104 B8
51 G9	52 H10	105 B9	106 D8
53 F12	54 D11	107 C9	108 A10



A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T

1 - 100

Black	White	Black	White
109 D3	110 D4	125 O12	126 T13
111 F6	112 J14	127 S13	128 J18
113 K14	114 P15	129 O15	130 O16
115 P14	116 K15	131 N14	132 T14
117 L15	118 L14	133 T12	134 S15
119 K13	120 M15	135 S14	136 T15
121 L16	122 O14	137 S12	138 M9
123 O13	124 N13	139 P4	140 Q4

[continued on page 26]

EVEN GAME FUSEKI STUDIES

by Honinbo Shusai

Tagaisen Fuseki Ho (even game fuseki studies) by Honinbo Shusai was translated by Masao Dodo, edited by Lee Foster Hartman, and made available in a small manuscript edition. This edited version retained some of the flavor of the original Japanese. W. D. Witt revised the manuscript, omitting most of the Japanese flavor for the sake of the American reader and a more direct approach to the probable Japanese meaning.

This version is based upon the Witt revision. Editing and Introduction are by Max Steinbook.

INTRODUCTION

These even game studies of the opening without handicap are primarily concerned with full board strategy or fuseki, as opposed to limited corner strategy, or joseki. However, since fuseki is largely based on the jockeying for position to obtain favorable corner development, the student should note particularly the corner joseki, as much as they are given in each study. This will make the understanding of the subsequent fuseki more intelligible to him, and each study will have a cumulative effect.

Ideally, the student should have a thorough knowledge of even game joseki; and the author of these studies, Honinbo Shusai, fully expected each student to have already perused his three volumes of even game corner play, and to refer to them from time to time to understand more fully the underlying motives of many of the plays. Unfortunately, no translation of his joseki is available at this time. It is important to keep in mind as much of the corner play as possible.

In classical Go, by custom, B always made his first play at R16, the chief reason for this having been to limit, after a fashion, the innumerable possibilities of opening play. Another reason was that at the time these studies were first published, R16 (or the equivalent in some other corner) was considered the best play that B could make. The reason that B usually played in that particular corner was more or less to produce a familiar pattern so that he would be more at home in the subsequent maneuvering.

These studies are thirty in number, and will be here published in the same order as originally written.

STUDY I

Black White
1 R16 2 P17

When W directly attacks •1, the best response is either at •3 or at a.


3 E16

This play has the advantage of inviting W to play at b, after which B would advance to •5. This latter

play would have a double advantage: first, it would be a good squeeze attack on •2; second, it could serve as the base for expansion along the nw border.

4 C5

This stone could have been played in the se instead.



A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T
Diagram 1

5 L17

It is advisable for B to play here now, whether or not W has played at b. If W should now play in another part of the board, this would permit B to play at Q17, and W would then naturally play P16, which would allow B to encircle W by playing Q14. As to other W defenses against •Q17, there is also the possibility of •R17, or •P14 may be played; and there are still other defenses not discussed here.

6 Q14

With the above dangerous possibility in view, W has chosen this play, which can be either defensive or offensive, according to subsequent developments. The slanting formation, •2 and •6, is called "formation of a hundred variations", being one from which countless varieties of opening corner play may develop.

7 P16

This is a common play to sever the connection between •2 and •6. It is probably the most common variation in corner play commencing with the •2-•6 attack against •1 (and similarly in other corners.) There are here two other common plays for B, one being R14, the other Q15 (c and d, Diagram 2). R15 may be considered feasible, although less common.




Diagram 2

8 O16

Usually W would now place a stone at e. At this early stage of the opening, it is of no consequence to discuss the comparative advantages of •e and •8.

9 P15

10 Q17

11 R15

These plays are indispensable after W's play at O16.

12 R17

W seizes the valuable corner position, which would otherwise have been taken by B.

13 R11

By this play, B now seeks compensation in taking territory along the e side.

Here let us review the progress of the opening up to this point:

In spite of B's initial advantage with R16 in the ne corner, W later has occupied the all-important three-three point, R17, with •12. Thus, as far as the corner is concerned, W has the advantage.

B, on the other hand, has occupied considerable territory by his advance to •13. In size of territories, however, W's corner is larger than B's side position.

Next, compare the position of •5 and •6. Against B's strong double-line position, W is practically helpless; whereas •5, although pitted against W's entrenchment still enjoys the advantage of possible extension toward the nw. Thus, between •5 and •6, the scale of strength leans decidedly in favor of B.

14 Q4

A good alternative would have been at f, but either g or h instead would have been exposed to an advantageous B attack at i or j respectively.

15 E4

B here has many possibilities from which to

choose; for example, either fortification at C16 or an attack at D3 would be feasible. He has, however, here chosen E4, for the purpose of occupying the s border towards the w.

16 D3

17 E3

18 D2

W here had an alternative in D4. Then B would play E5, followed by •D6. This development occurs frequently, and should be remembered.

19 J3

This is a very important play. If omitted, W would play J4, which would render the condition of B's stones at E4 and E3 extremely precarious; and at the same time W would extend his territory along the entire s border.

20 C17

Ordinarily, the attack on E16 would be made at C16. In this case, however, B has L17 as a valuable outpost to the initial corner play E16. This outpost might also have been at J17 or K17. With it at any of these three points, it is advisable for W to break up his opponent's position by playing at the three-three point, C17. W now awaits, among other possibilities, a counter-attack by B at C15. If this occurs, W would play D16. Should B then follow with D15, W would extend to E17; and should B then pursue with F17, W would sharply counter with F18. Then, if B should connect at F16, W would follow with G18; or if B should choose G17 instead of F16, W's play would be the same, G18. In this case, where B's outpost is at L17, W would next extend to H18; but if the outpost were at K17, then G18 would be the last play by W in this section for the time being.

21 D17

In order to avoid the above described development, B guards the left hand upper side by this blocking play.

22 C16

W extends. Often •D15, followed by •B14 is then played; but in this case it would leave the position open to a W attack at H16. B therefore finds it advisable to play at E14 next.

23 E14

24 C13

W advances down the left side.

25 O15

Now B takes the initiative and bottles up the W group in the ne corner. This is a severe blow to W, who is forced to defend his position with N16.

26 N16

27 N18

B threatens to cut at O17.

28 O18

W defends himself against the cut.

29 N17

30 O17

B again threatens to cut, and W connects.

31 L15

B, still having the initiative, completes his bottling up operation with this play.

32 L3

W now takes the initiative by a shift of front and goes to this point, which is an offensive against the B s border position and is also an ambitious extension along the lower side from his stone at Q4. W here had an alternative in H15. (At an opportune time,

B may choose to attack the entire W position in the upper right corner: by playing S17. Then •S18 and •T18 would develop into a ko, with the life of the entire W group at stake.)

33 R6

This has a purpose similar to that of •L3.


34 O4

A natural sequel to •R6.

35 E 12


Should B omit this play, he would still be vulnerable to a W attack at H15. B's play, therefore, has a two-fold defensive significance: it defends the territory along the n side, and at the same time indirectly strengthens the black group of three stones in the sw. It also serves to apply pressure on the white formation down the w side. Thus it will be seen that E 12 is a good example of a stone with triple effectiveness.

Un-annotated Master Game No 1.
[Continued from page 23]




101 - 200

Black	White	Black	White
141 Q3	142 Q2	179 E6	180 S1
143 R3	144 P5	181 C3	182 C2
145 P2	146 O3	183 B3	184 B2
147 N10	148 R2	185 D6	186 C6
149 S2	150 O2	187 M8	188 L8
151 R1	152 N17	189 N16	190 M17
153 M14	154 P1	191 M16	192 K19
155 M18	156 N18	193 L18	194 Q1
157 B16	158 M10	195 T2	196 K1
159 M11	160 L11	197 J1	198 L1
161 M12	162 K11	199 L3	200 M2
163 J11	164 J10	201 H3	202 H5
165 K12	166 L10	203 G5	204 E8
167 B18	168 B17	205 F4	206 E5
169 A17	170 C18	207 F8	208 E7
171 G17	172 G18	209 G1	210 A9
173 K18	174 J19	211 B11	212 A11
175 N19	176 O19	213 H8	214 J8
177 M19	178 O18	215 J15	216 G14




201 - 244

Black	White	Black	White
217 M6	218 M5	231 K4	232 J5
219 M7	220 P8	233 N4	234 O4
221 P9	222 H12	235 L12	236 N9
223 H11	224 G12	237 O9	238 K9
225 G13	226 G11	239 A13	240 B13
227 J12	228 B19	241 D5	242 C5
229 A18	230 J6	243 L6	244 K6



A B C D E F
Problem 1



A B C D E F G H
Problem 2


THE CLASSICAL HANDICAP JOSEKI

Part II


Black secures the corner

The first article of this series discussed the broad principles of classical handicap play. In this issue we shall consider the more important variations of the joseki which Black selects when his intention is to secure the corner against the White attack at F3. Black has two choices; he can play 2 F4, a relatively strong play, or in certain circumstances he may elect to play 2 E3, which although it secures the corner is nevertheless weak in that it gives little opportunity for expansion.

The F4 Joseki



A B C D E F G H
Diagram 1



A B C D E F G H
Diagram 2

W's answer 3 G4 to B's 2 F4 is invariable. Similarly B's 4 F5 almost always follows. In the beginning of a game it would not be recommended that B play at a (Diagram 1), although it may be advisable if there are already hostile stones nearby. After these four plays, however, W has a choice of several continuations; for example: a, b, c, d, e, or f. To 5 at a, B always answers 6 D3. The resulting position (Diagram 2) is the basis of a number of important joseki.

A. 5 E3


I. 7 E4

For the seventh play, W again has several options. The cut at E4, shown in Diagrams 3 and 4, is by no means the best of these—it is better for W to first make the preparatory play a or b. Since B can easily make mistakes in fighting this cut, however, it will be profitable to consider the play.


In diagram 3, the D5 stone is lost after 10 D6. 10 C5 would not be good. B would thereby demonstrate that he did not know the joseki and feared losing the corner, and the black stones around F4 would be exposed to attack. B's 12 D2 is very important, and may on no account be omitted. W may now continue with 13 H3, to which B replies 14 C6, or W may play 13 E2, leading to 14 G3.

Instead of the play shown in Diagram 3, which can lead to complications, B can choose the variation shown in Diagram 4. By his 8 D5, B gives up the F4 and F5 stones, gaining instead an extension along the

w border. After 10 D6, W has little choice; if he does not play E6, the cut at E4 is fruitless.




A B C D E F G H J K L
Diagram 3




A B C D E F G H
Diagram 4

II. 7 K3

If as the seventh play W elects K3, B must protect himself against the threatened cut at E4. D6 is the best play (Diagram 5). After 11, B can play elsewhere. It is necessary, however, that he know how to protect himself if W should invade at C5. The correct defense is given in Diagram 6.



A B C D E F G H J K L
Diagram 5



A B C D E F G H
Diagram 6


•14 is noteworthy as a good play which often recurs in similar situations. 14 C6 would not be good. 19 B4 would lead to speedy death for W through 20 B3. 21 B3 would be bad because of 22 B5.

III. 7 G5

The play 7 G5 is most often selected by W when there is a black stone at K4 (e.g., in a game of 6 or more handicap stones). In the following development (Diagram 7) it is assumed that there is no stone at K4. 8 G6 is the best answer. D6 is not quite as strong. If W now plays 9 F6, B answers 10 D6. It is to be

noted that 10 E6 would not be good; it would serve only to reinforce the effect of the F6 stone.

Alternatively, W may play 9 at a. This is almost invariably the case when B has a stone on K4. Black answers with 10 D6.




A B C D E F G H J K L
Diagram 7

IV. 7 C6

To 7 C6, B replies 8 C5, and the play continues as shown in Diagram 8 below. 9 is very good, for if B does not play D6, W continues with D5 and threatens to play E4 or C4. 9 D6 would be weaker; B would usually answer 10 E4, which prevents W from cutting and at the same time threatens a play at G3.


B is well advised not to answer W's 11 B6, but rather to play elsewhere. If he nevertheless wishes to continue play in this corner, then either a or b would be good attacks. c might also be considered, with the caution that W need not answer this play. He can well afford to give up the B6, C6 stones in order to establish an attack on another group. The play 12 E6, which one often sees in a beginner's game, is very poor.




A B C D E F G H J K
Diagram 8

V. 7 L3

After this play, B usually replies 8 D6, and the joseki continues as in Diagram 9. After 11 J3, B will generally play to shut his opponent off from the center. 12 H3 is, however, also a very good play. (Much better than 12 H4, to which W would reply 13 H3.) If W answers with 13 H4, there follows 14 J2, 15 K3, 16 G3 and the W position falls to pieces. W therefore plays 13 J2, giving the position shown in Diagram 10.



A B C D E F G H J K L M
Diagram 9




A B C D E F G H J K L M
Diagram 10

B. 5 E2

I. 7 D3

The preceding joseki are based on W's playing 5 E3. A frequent alternative is 5 E2, to which B answers 6 E3. W may now answer 7 D3; if he does, the three succeeding plays (Diagram 11) admit of no variation.




A B C D E F G H
Diagram 11

W will now generally protect the D3 stone; this looks small, but is in fact very important. Should W instead play a, for example, B answers by capturing with 12 D2, and has an unassailable corner. B's best response to 11 is 12 G5 (Diagram 12); this makes the B position very strong, and forces W to concentrate a large number of stones in a small territory. If on the other hand W is given opportunity to play G5, the W position would have been good and the B, poor.

Beginners might feel that 13 is weak, and that 13 C10 would be preferable, but this would be an error. It would lead to 14 H4, and W would be constrained to a small territory here.

14 is B's strongest continuation. If W attacks at C4, B simply gives up the C3 stone, strengthening his position on the w border in compensation. Instead of 14 C10, beginners often play C5, C6 or D6 in order not to lose the C3 stone, but this is unsound; it leads to a concentration of stones. From a strong wall one must make a bold extension.




A B C D E F G H J
Diagram 12

A B C D E F G H
Diagram 13

A compromise which may be adopted under unfavorable circumstances is 14 C8. After this, W cannot successfully attack at C4; for example, the play might proceed as shown in Diagram 13.

II. 7 G2

If instead of the above, W plays 7 G2 (Diagram 14) almost all beginners will make the mistake of playing 8 D2. This is a bad blunder; W can play C3 and live in the corner, since after B D3, W plays C2 and has the double threat D1 or B5. The correct answer to 7 G2 is 8 C3. After this, both players will generally have more important plays to make elsewhere on the board before returning to this corner. For B, however, a play at D2 is fairly profitable. On the other hand, if W plays D2, B need not answer; he can well afford to give up the E3 stone (if W should press on with D3) in exchange for a strong play elsewhere.




A B C D E F G H
Diagram 14

C. 5 D3

It is to be observed that the order of W's plays 5 E2 and 7 D3 may be reversed without otherwise affecting the order of play. B's play is still 6 E3. This is a frequent variation of the above joseki.

D. 5 C3

Diagram 15 shows the only correct answer. 6 C4 would not be good; it would result in 7 D3, 8 E3, 9 E2, 10 E4, 11 G2 or G3. Similarly 6 D3 is not to be recommended because of 7 C4, 8 D5, 9 B6.




A B C D E F G H
Diagram 15

A B C D E F G H
Diagram 16

W now has several choices; 7 G3 protects his stones preparatory to an expansion on the s border; B replies 8 C4, leading to the position shown in Diagram 16. B has a secure corner.

Or W may play 7 C4; 8 C6 is the best answer, since W is thereby confined to a small territory in the corner, and B still threatens to play G3 (Diagram 17). Or W may play 7 B5, to which B replies 8 G3.




A B C D E F G H
Diagram 17

A B C D E F G H
Diagram 18

E. 5 G5


B's best answer is shown in Diagram 18 above. W's 7 G3 prepares for an invasion at C3, with the purpose of obtaining a better position around 7 even if B should prevent a connection between 9 and 7. B has only one good counter-play F6. After 9, B can play 10 as shown, or he may instead play at a. (If W had played 7 G2, B would have had no option but to play first F2, then F6.)

8 C7 would not be good, as Diagram 19 shows. Somewhat better than C7, but not as good as F6, would be 8 F2, shown in Diagram 20. In this last variant, 9 G2 would lead to 10 F6.



A B C D E F G H

Diagram 19




A B C D E F G H

Diagram 20


F. 5 C6

This leads to the joseki shown in Diagram 21. 8 is absolutely necessary, otherwise W plays C3, and the B position is destroyed, as in Diagram 22.



A B C D E F G H

Diagram 21




A B C D E F G H

Diagram 22

The Small-corner Joseki


The E3 reply to W's F3 attack on the handicap stone is only to be recommended when B is so shut in that no extension to the center is possible. It should not be selected when there is any other alternative. Beginners often make the error of considering it all-important to secure the corner, so that in consequence W becomes very strong on the sides and toward the center.

W has no alternative to F4 in response to B's E3. If he plays elsewhere, B plays F4, and has a good position. To W's F4, B must answer C5; if he greedily stretches to C6 or C7, W can play C3 and live in the corner, and the B stones are left with no base. The remainder of the joseki is shown in Diagram 23.



A B C D E F G



Diagram 23



A B C D E F G


Diagram 24

Observe that W cannot play 5 C3 and live in the corner after B's 4 C5. For example, the play might proceed as in Diagram 24. The reader may establish for himself that the W invaders can always be killed, no matter what line of defense W may adopt.

A B C D E
Problem 3

A B C D E F G H J K L

Problem 4 Tough 5



A B C D E F G H J K L M

Problem 5

SOLUTIONS OF PROBLEMS

Problem 1

•1 A5! Only through this play can B live. •A4 would be wrong since there would follow: •A5, •B5, •A2, and if black answers •A3, W with A6 takes three stones. Black must therefore play •A6, taking one stone, upon which •A3 wins, since it leaves B with but one real eye. After •1 A3 or B4 would follow •A5 and after •1 B5 would follow •A3, each one being fatal to B.

Problem 2

•1 B2, •2 C1, •3 B1, •4 E1, •5 C2.

If B plays at any other point besides •1 B2 he can be killed. You probably have found this out when working on this problem. If you have not, assume B plays at either •A2, •B1, or •C1; and you have three problems in which W is to kill the B position.

[The editors of The American Go Journal welcome letters from its readers. Because of limited space, a letter as long as the following can seldom be printed. But this analysis of modern Go in relationship to classical Go not only is intrinsically interesting but also presents a distinctly American view, since it is based upon study of Japanese games without the aid of translations from the Japanese.]

The editors do not necessarily share the views of its readers, whose letters must stand upon their merits.]

Sirs:

I read the first copy of the Journal with great interest, and I need hardly say that I approve wholeheartedly and wish us all the best of luck. The following remarks will therefore be an attempt at constructive criticism, and you may use or disregard them at will.

I feel thoroughly aggrieved by several deprecatory references to the classical Go strategy from Shusaku to Shusai. I frankly admit that I do not know what the expression "extreme formalism" means. A classical player was not tied to any iron rule. He was free to play wherever he liked, and the classical players were constantly experimenting with new strategic developments, just as the moderns are. They furthermore developed a number of strategic principles which even today are considered basic to any better go-play. True, the moderns put some refinements on these principles. Go strategy does not stand still. But I doubt that these refinements are weightier than the improvement of Shusai over Shusaku.

What were the innovations of the classics? I can't tell on Japanese authority because I have not been able to read Japanese sufficiently well. But from a study of the games I conclude the following:

Shusaku stipulated that every attacking and defensive play should tie into an over-all strategic plan. Do not attack indiscriminately or your own stone may find itself squeezed between two opposing chains. In its most primitive form: do not attack in the opening unless your attacking stone has a reasonable chance to form a territory. Do not defend with a narrow play on the spot if you can defend with a space winning play from afar. Shusaku was, I think, the first to apply the principle of indirect attack and defense to the opening.

The famous Shusaku opening was an application of this principle. Black shall play R16 and Q3, and W can attack both of these stones in turn; but if B follows up with C4, W cannot attack this stone likewise, or Black P4 will put one of his two attacking men in jeopardy. Thus Black C4 is temporarily immune to attack. B has secured a decisive strategic advantage.

The formidable Shusaku opening dominated the play of the game for about 20 years, until a discovery was made which appears to me as stupendous as anything the moderns have to show, and which led to a revision of Shusaku's original principles. This discovery was that by playing "high" in his own corner

(D16) W could force B to play high likewise around D4. If B persisted in "safe" playing, loss of influence in the center would give him the inferior position.

Out of this discovery Murase developed the three-fold principle of balance of influence which has remained the unshaken base of Go strategy to this day. This principle reads:

Balance territorial border expansion by similar expansion.

Balance influence on the center by similar influence.

Balance a weak chain of your own by similarly weakening an opponent's chain. (The Japanese say: "if you must flee with your chain, take your opponent's chain as a companion.")

If you cannot keep the balance in one of these fields, create a sufficient over-balance in another field to compensate. Conversely, a weak chain of yours or loss of center influence may easily out-balance your larger border territory.

This revised principle of the balance of influence shattered the Shusaku tactics to bits. By the early years of the twentieth century the once famous Shusaku opening was rarely, if ever, seen in tournament games. Instead, the grand masters of the time—Shusai, Nakagawa, Iwasa, Suzuki, Nagana, Kogishi, Segoshi and Kato—experimented in a novel large scale strategy of unsurpassed boldness and brilliancy. Every one of the famous modern corner joseki can be found in these adventurous games. For example, a game played in 1901 between Shusai and Nakagawa contains in the D4 corner the same development that Yasunaga discusses with pride in the first issue of the Journal.

What did the moderns add to this? Their original statement was startling enough. They said: over and over again it has been proved that "high" pressure points are more valuable than "low" territory points. The wall on the fourth line out-weighs the under-lying creeping on the third line, the outside lining of the border is worth more than its inner lining. Why bother with territory points at all? Territory will come in the middle game. Take the "high" pressure points, and if your opponent is fool enough to go on the borders, he will lose.

Every strategy is good when it is met by strategy of the same kind. The young players among themselves found the new strategy perfectly satisfactory. The public was fascinated by spectacular possibilities. Here, at long last, you had wonderful large scale strategy, not as the province of a select few, but within the reach of any tyro. You just play your first stones on the handicap points and you are bound to play large scale. You can't help it. You needn't even exert your brain cells.

A few older masters stubbornly declared the new strategy to be unsound. They were widely disbelieved

until a test came when they met the younger generation. It seems to me that the importance of those early games may have been missed, particularly the game between Honinbo and Go Sei Gen. It was a challenge of the first order. Go Sei Gen played the most outrageously modern opening. Honinbo replied with the most conservative classical precepts. After a gruelling fight Honinbo won—because he was a wizard—and both players reviewed the results.

The Honinbo's friends felt that the fight should not have been so hard. The Honinbo had changed his original strategy in the course of the opening. If he had changed one or two plays earlier, the game would have been a walk-over.

Go Sei Gen's friends were even more thoroughly crushed. They would not have thought such a result possible. They likewise saw that Honinbo could have improved on his strategy.

As a result of this stock-taking, both sides revised their strategy. Play on the handicap points, particularly the central spot, was abandoned. It was felt that these neutral plays, while extremely flexible, did not put enough pressure upon the opponent. He retained the initiative in choosing where to play.

In the later thirties, therefore, we see a return to asymmetrical plays. The board is again divided into unequal sectors, we notice again the long and short borders.

But with this return to asymmetry, certain of your influence spheres become more vulnerable to attack than others. They need additional protection, and early plays toward the border make their appearance again. These "territory plays" were by no means as unnecessary as the moderns had thought.

What remains is a number of new joseki, or at least isolated joseki attempts of the past now become quite popular and are thoroughly investigated. We have a modified valuation of "high" and "low" plays. But these changes had already started in the period of Shusai and are an evolution of the ideas then prevailing rather than a revolution. I cannot notice any thorough-going break. There seems to me less difference between the strategy of Kato and Sekiyama than between Sekiyama and Go Sei Gen. Fujisawa seems to me much closer to the classics than he is to Maeda or Hayashi.

And it seems to me extremely advisable for every Go player to study the games of the classics. Our Journal, I think, should avoid even the shadow of a suspicion that we would dare dissuade such a study—even more should we avoid any suggestion of a deprecatory attitude toward any of the grand masters of the game.

—Rudolf Aron

SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS [continued from page 30]

Problem 3

A delightful problem! Despite its simple construction, this problem will be difficult for most players. •1 C3 is correct. Other beginnings can be readily answered. White answers •2 D3 whence •3 A5, •4 A3. The continuation is left to the reader. There are not many possible choices. Black must finally sacrifice a small part of his chain in order not to lose the entire position.

Problem 4

This is the simplest problem in this issue. Its main virtue is to demonstrate the importance of sente (initiative). •1 E1 has to be answered with •2 C1; otherwise B will break out into the corner. Now B replies •3 H1.

Problem 5 *see letter to editor Vol. 1 #3 pg. 48*
•1 E1! Black lives by using the lost stones C2 and D2 as strong threats. White answers •2 C1. (•F1 would not be as good; for there would follow •3 G1, •4 D1, •5 G2 threatening 3 stones, and Black lives through •7 J1.) Continuing the original and correct line of play, we have •3 D1, •4 F1, •5 G1, •6 C1 + 4, •7 G2 threatening three W stones; and B lives.

A Go Primer, by Dr Gilbert W. Rosenthal

This is a mimeographed manual of 81 pages for a 13 by 13 board. It is an excellent presentation of the small board game, particularly suitable for beginners. The price is \$ 2.00, including mailing. All orders should be addressed to Dr G. W. Rosenthal, 1739 Eutaw Place, Baltimore 17, Maryland, accompanied by remittance.

A LOOK AT THE FUTURE

The editors regret the lateness of this issue, and offer their apologies. The only hope of fulfilling our obligation to produce sixty-four pages per year is to change our original plans to the extent of combining the next two issues into a single issue of thirty-two pages. We trust that this will meet with your approval and sympathetic understanding. We anticipate mailing the next issue, therefore, in about four months.

With the tacit consent of our subscribers, we plan to list their names and addresses in the next issue, with a view to encouraging contacts, especially with new players. In the same connection, we again ask that members inform us of meeting places and times in various parts of the country, that we may publish such information.

At present, we have about ninety subscribers. Production costs run about one hundred dollars per issue. Although we may assume that in the long run the number of Go players will increase to the point where costs are no longer a problem, nevertheless it would appear that if publication is to continue, a number of "sustaining members" will have to be found. We hope that, if possible, you will elect yourself a member of this select circle—with, say, a check for ten dollars as the only ballot needed (payable to Jay Eliasberg, and omit the word "Treasurer").

For the long run, numbers are needed. To this end, we now offer special "student" subscriptions at one dollar per year.

Finally, we would repeat the request made in the first issue: that you let us have your reactions, suggestions, and criticisms.

The Editors